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Abstract 
 
In the Norwegian electricity system, new 
consumption patterns and changing load profiles 
increase an already apparent need for reinvestment in 
the aging network infrastructure. This is very costly, 
and network operators consider alternative ways of 
increasing capacity, which are less costly and more 
flexible. One such option is end-user flexibility. In the 
paper, we give an overview of the Norwegian 
electricity market and regulation and the potential of 
end-user flexibility. We present an investment case 
provided by a network company, which illustrates that 
the choice of compensation method to customers have 
a large impact on the cost and/or revenue cap in the 
regulatory model. By issuing direct payments for 
flexibility services, end-user flexibility results in a 
lower efficiency, although the revenue cap may be 
higher, while redistribution of network tariffs have a 
marginal effect on efficiency and the revenue cap. 
Through redistribution of network tariffs, the network 
operator can defer investments without a notable 
change in the revenue cap or change in efficiency. This 
highlights some of the future challenges that the 
regulator faces in setting a regulatory framework for 
end-user flexibility and it challenges the vertical 
separation that has been a corner stone in the 
deregulated electricity market. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The unique physical properties of electricity define 
how electricity systems are designed. Since supply and 
demand must be perfectly balanced at all times, 
changes in demand must be matched by a similar 
change in supply. Furthermore, the electricity system is 
built to be a redundant network. To ensure a reliable 
electricity supply and a sufficient safeguard against 
loss of power, network operators determine 
investments based on the hours of peak load in a year. 
This often results in significant investments in network 
capacity to ensure that reliability and safety standards 
are met. Thus, optimizing investment decisions 
through smarter electricity system solutions is highly 
prioritized by Norwegian network operators. 
The global trends of electrification, decentralization 
and digitalization increase the focus on finding 
innovative ways of planning and upgrading the 
electricity system infrastructure. The trends introduce a 
plethora of new solutions to the network operator. To 
ensure a secure and stable supply of electricity, 
exploiting flexible resources and capabilities in the 
electricity system is highlighted as a promising way 
forward. However, utilizing flexible capacities in the 
electricity system is not a new concept. With a tight 
relationship between supply and demand, flexible 
generation and production has been implemented by 
large generators and producers at the transmission level 
of the Norwegian electricity systems for several years. 
Since technological advances mainly occur at the 
distribution level of the electricity system, there is a 
large, untapped potential in utilizing flexibility at the 
end-user level. This type of end-user flexibility can be 
used to shift consumption in periods of peak-load, 
mitigating the need for costly investments in network 
infrastructure.  
With an increasing share of decentralized energy 
production, Europe´s highest EV penetration rate and 
an aging and mature infrastructure, new and cost-
efficient ways of securing sufficient capacity is a 
priority. On the other hand, the Norwegian electricity 
system is well equipped for the challenges of the 
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future. With 98% of all electricity production coming 
from flexible and renewable hydro power energy, 
mature and multinational markets with satisfying 
liquidity in the day-ahead, intra-day and real time 
market and power tariffs being introduced by 2021, 
Norway could get a head start in terms of smart 
electricity infrastructure management compared to the 
rest of Europe. 
In this paper, we discuss the design of the 
Norwegian electricity market, and how end-user 
flexibility can be of value in the Norwegian electricity 
system. We provide an overview over different 
benefits and applications of end-user flexibility 
described in the literature. By means of a case study, 
we discuss how Norwegian network operators can 
utilize end-user flexibility to defer investments in 
network infrastructure. It is clear that the way the 
DSOs can compensate end-users have a large effect on 
the profitability of using end-user flexibility. This is 
due to the incentive model in the regulation of the 
network monopolies, and illustrates that the vertical 
separation that has been a corner stone of the 
deregulation of the electricity market so far, may be 
challenged by the developments of smart grid solutions 
and more active consumers in the local grids. 
 
2. Vertical separation in the Norwegian 
electricity system  
 
To ensure a reliable, safe and cost-efficient supply 
of electricity, responsibilities and tasks are assigned to 
different participants in the electricity system. The 
responsibility of the Transmission System Operator 
(TSO) is to ensure operation and development of the 
transmission network, and to control frequency. In 
Norway, there is only one TSO, Statnett. The 
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) own and 
operate the distribution networks within different 
regions, and are responsible for supplying end-users 
with electricity. There are 105 DSOs in Norway. The 
TSO and DSOs are responsible for transporting 
electricity and controlling overload and voltage. In 
Norway, entering a contract with a DSO is mandatory 
for consumers in order to receive electricity. 
Consumers are not free to choose the DSO, as 
operators have monopoly within their respective 
regions. The monopoly situation for DSOs and the 
TSO is a result of the deregulation process that 
occurred in the early 90s. 
However, a competitive market exists for the 
purchase and sale of electricity. Consumers are free to 
choose which retailer to buy their electricity from. 
When providing electricity to end-users, the retailer 
purchases electricity from generators at the Power 
Exchange (PX), or by off-exchange trading through 
bilateral contracts. The producers and DSOs pay the 
TSO for being connected to and using the transmission 
network, whilst consumers pay to the DSOs. 
Norwegian power generation is dominated by 
hydro power (> 95 %), although recently, there has 
been an increase in renewable generation, especially 
wind power. Total storage capacity is about 70 % of 
the Norwegian demand. 
 
2.1. The wholesale market 
  
The current market regime consists of several 
wholesale market places. The trading in the different 
markets is mostly in a sequential manner, determined 
by how close to real-time operation one trades. The 
main part of the wholesale market is the day-ahead 
market operated by Nord Pool and Euphemia, the latter 
representing the joint European market place. In this 
market, buyers and sellers submit their bid curves for 
every single hour in the following day. The power 
exchange finds the prices that match demand 
(purchase) and supply (sales) hour by hour. Because of 
intermittent production and unplanned outages, 
participants can also trade in the intraday market to 
ensure balance. As opposed to the day-ahead market, 
which is cleared simultaneously for all hours of the 
day, the intraday market is cleared continuously. The 
bids and corresponding commitments are aggregated at 
zonal levels in both markets.  
The bids from the day-ahead and intraday markets 
have an hourly resolution that ensures market balance 
in the planning phase. However, to ensure real time 
balance, the TSO organizes reserve markets with 
different time horizons. The reserves are primarily 
dispatchable, large generators that increase or decrease 
generation to stabilize the frequency. The market 
participants calculate and report deviations between 
planned and metered sale and purchase, after each 
single operational hour. The economic consequences of 
any imbalances are settled by the TSO in accordance to 
imbalance prices. Both the day-ahead, intraday and 
reserves market share the common objective of 
ensuring balance between generation and load in the 
most efficient way. 
 
2.2. The end-user market 
  
Most consumers purchase their electricity from a 
retailer. The terms are specified through a supply 
contract between each consumer and a freely chosen 
retailer. The retailer takes part in the wholesale market 
and is responsible for assuring balance on behalf of 
their group of consumers. This part of the market is 
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denoted as the end-user side or demand side of the 
market. Contracts with fixed or variable prices are 
most common for consumers with periodically metered 
consumption. Variable price contracts usually have a 
fixed price for a period, for example based on the area 
prices (usually monthly prices). Another contract 
follows the market price from the day-ahead market. 
Since prices vary hourly, the aggregated consumption 
for a consumer in a period is distributed, in accordance 
to a pre-defined profile, to calculate an average price 
per kWh. Larger consumers with hourly meters can 
have contracts that settles according to hourly 
consumption and corresponding hourly market prices. 
Changes in consumption metering are currently being 
undertaken by the industry. 
Network contracts with the local DSO have a 
different contract structure. These contracts mainly 
cover the DSOs expenses related to operation, 
maintenance and reinforcement of the distribution 
network. In addition to covering costs, the contracts 
aim to distribute expenses fairly among the network 
consumers.  
 
2.3. Incentive based regulation of distribution 
grids 
  
To promote efficient energy markets and cost-
effective energy systems, a revenue cap regulation was 
introduced by NVE in 1997. The revenue cap 
regulation is part of the regulation on economic and 
technical reporting, revenue cap for network operators 
and tariffs (Olje- og Energidepartementet, 2017). The 
revenue cap should cover the network operator’s costs 
and give a reasonable return on assets under the 
assumption of efficient operation, reasonable 
maintenance and network development. When 
calculating a company’s cost-efficiency, the regulator 
uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for the 
benchmarking (NVE, 2017e). 
The revenue cap for the forthcoming year is 
notified by NVE in November the year in advance, and 
network operators set their tariffs accordingly. All data, 
results and calculations are published to ensure 
transparency and understanding of the methodology. 
The Revenue cap for each company is calculated from 
the actual total costs two years back, adjusted for 
inflation and price changes, and a cost norm, using the 
yardstick formula: 
 
RCt = (1-ρ)Ct + ρCt* 
 
where RCt is the revenue cap for period t, Ct is the 
company's cost, and Ct* is the cost norm calculated 
from the benchmarking. ρ is the weight of the cost 
norm, and in Norway, ρ is presently equal to 0.6. The 
size of ρ reflects the strength of the efficiency 
incentives in the regulation model (Amundsveen and 
Kvile, 2015). 
The total cost includes operation and maintenance 
costs (OPEX), capital expenses (CAPEX) consisting of 
linear depreciations on book values and interest based 
on the regulated rate of return, that the regulator (NVE) 
sets every year. Moreover, the cost includes losses in 
MWh priced at the system price from the electricity 
market (Nord Pool), and finally a quality element, 
KILE, which is a calculation of the value of lost load 
(VOLL). Figure 1 shows the total cost of 119 
distribution companies in 2016. 
The cost norm, Ct*, is calculated in three steps: the 
DEA, a regression analysis to consider geographical 
differences and a final calibration. The DEA-model 
used by NVE is an input oriented model with a CRS 
assumption (Bjørndal et al., 2010). By identifying the 
most efficient companies, the DEA finds the 
companies that provide services using the least amount 
of resources. These companies form the efficiency 
frontier, and are denoted as reference companies. In the 
current model for distribution networks, the resources 
are represented by total costs. The tasks performed by 
the company are represented by output variables on 
kilometers of high voltage power lines, number of 
customers and number of network stations.  
 
 Figure 1. Cost for distribution companies 
 
In the second step, the results of the DEA are 
adjusted for differences in their operational framework, 
to provide a more just comparison of the companies. 
The results are adjusted for differences in topography, 
climate and network structures using regression 
analyses.  
In the third and final step of the benchmarking 
exercise, the DEA-results are calibrated such that the 
average company becomes 100 % efficient.  This will 
give the average network operator a reasonable return 
on assets, and it ensures that, over time, age differences 
are taken into consideration. The calibration is 
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necessary to give network operators incentives to 
invest in new assets. Adding up the DEA-norm for the 
entire industry from step 2 and then subtracting it from 
the total industry cost, gives the total revenue that is 
added to companies' revenues. In 2018, this number 
was approximately 1.5 billion NOK (NVE, 2017g), i.e. 
a considerable amount. The added revenue is 
distributed according to the company’s regulatory asset 
base divided by the industry's total regulatory asset 
base. The larger the added revenue, the greater is the 
incentive to increase assets through investments.  
 
2.4. Grid tariffs 
  
The allowed revenue of a distribution company is 
collected from the customers, using the principle of 
two- or multi-part tariffs, i.e. a variable fee to cover 
marginal cost, and one or more residual parts to make 
up for the total allowed revenue. The Norwegian 
system operates with network contracts made up by 
multiple tariffs, dependent on the consumer’s method 
of metering. Most households currently have periodical 
meters, and their payments consist of two parts: an 
energy fee and a fixed fee. The energy fee is usually a 
semi-fixed price per kWh multiplied with metered 
consumption, whilst the fixed fee can be determined 
based on the size of the main fuse. For some 
consumers, especially the larger ones, there could be 
an additional fee based on peak power usage in a 
period. This fee is known as a power charge, and is 
usually made up by a fixed price per kWh/h per month.  
 
3. Grid investment needs and alternatives 
to grid 
 
In Reiten et al. (2014), four key drivers for 
estimating future investment needs in the Norwegian 
electricity system was identified. The first is the 
technical state of current infrastructure. Substantial 
network investments occurred in the 1970 and 1980s, 
and parts of the current infrastructure is approaching 
the end of its technical lifetime. Ensuring that the 
overall state of the electricity system is able to handle 
future electricity demand, load profiles and new 
appliances is important. Thus, substantial investments 
are needed at all network levels in the years to come.  
The second driver identified was population 
growth, urbanization and increased electricity demand. 
A growing population increases electricity demand, 
thus resulting in a need for new network infrastructure 
to respond to this increase in demand. Furthermore, 
population growth rates are higher in urban areas and 
large cities, meaning that the DSOs in these areas will 
have higher investment needs than the ones in more 
remote areas.  
A third driver for investments in the electricity 
system is compliance with national- and international 
climate goals through increased use of new energy 
carriers. Although the Norwegian electricity system 
has benefitted from flexible hydropower, the increased 
use of renewable power generation challenges the 
electricity system. Prosumers that sell their energy 
back to the network will also increase the complexity 
of the electricity system, highlighting the need for 
investments.  
The fourth and last driver that was highlighted was 
connected to load increase predictions. The 
electrification of the transport sector, new power 
demanding home appliances and the introduction of 
automatic metering all affect the future load demand, 
and challenge the network in several ways. The 
electrification of the transport sector is a critical 
challenge for the current Norwegian electricity system. 
Historically, combustion engines and fossil fuels have 
been used in vehicles, leading to an electricity system 
that was not dimensioned for a full electrification of 
this sector. Areas in close proximity to transport 
centers such as harbors, train- and bus stations will 
experience increases in power demand with the 
electrification of the transport sector. This leads to a 
substantial investment need for capacity increasing 
investments at the distribution and regional network 
level. 
In addition to these key drivers, the general 
advances in technology have led to discussions of a 
“smarter network”, where end-user flexibility and 
flexibility from the demand side is a key component. 
By involving the end-user through a third-party 
flexibility aggregator, network operators can access 
flexibility volumes that are currently hard to obtain for 
the specific hours when capacity is needed. Since 
changing consumption patterns challenge the network 
capacity, flexible end-users can help alleviate peaks 
and balance demand and supply.  
In conclusion, during the period from 2016 to 2025, 
NVE has estimated investment costs of 33 billion NOK 
and 15 billion NOK in the high-voltage and low-
voltage parts of the Norwegian distribution network 
respectively (NVE, 2016). Since investments at the 
distribution level of the electricity system traditionally 
has been based on the specific hour in a calendar year 
where the power output and consumption is estimated 
to be at its highest, load increase predictions play a 
vital part in the investment decision network operators 
undertake. By utilizing end-user flexibility and smarter 
investment solutions, network operators aim to 
optimize their network performance while reducing the 
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overall investment costs in new infrastructure through 
better peak load management. 
As a consequence, grid companies are looking for 
alternatives to grid investments in general, including 
end-user flexibility and new tariffs, but also assessing 
the effects of a large increase in the number of 
prosumers, storage capacity and microgrids. THEMA 
Consulting (2015) made a scenario analysis 
highlighting the potential uncertainty in Norwegian 
investment needs, depending on the proliferation of the 
aforementioned developments. The future use of local 
grids may imply increased (more rush-hour customers 
due to electric vehicles and other household 
appliances) or reduced (end-user flexibility and 
prosumers) maximum load, more variation in capacity 
utilization (the grid as a back-up solution) and shorter 
periods of use. 
 
4. End-user flexibility – an overview of 
mechanisms, benefits and applications 
 
End-user flexibility can be defined as the end-
user’s ability and capacity to shift, curtail or limit 
consumption for short or long periods of time. This 
may be the result of market prices, price incentives in 
networks tariffs or other mechanisms, potentially not 
involving economic incentives. Thus, end-user 
flexibility is a concept that includes a diverse set of 
dimensions (see also Oren (2013) and Ottesen (2017).  
 
4.1. Implicit and explicit end-user flexibility 
  
A common distinction used in the literature is 
between implicit and explicit end-user flexibility. 
While implicit end-user flexibility implies that the end-
users adjust their consumption patterns according to 
price signals, explicit end-user flexibility is 
characterized by incentivizing end-users to trade their 
flexibility in an organized market place (Ramos et al., 
2013).  
Implicit end-user flexibility is often referred to as 
price-based flexibility, and implies that end-users 
adjust their consumption to price signals or track 
variations in price through apps or appliances. 
Common price signals are time based power tariffs 
such as Time-of-Use (ToU) and Real Time Pricing 
(RTP), or demand based power tariffs such as Critical 
Peak Pricing (CPP), which raises the price of 
electricity when the peak demand is high (EG3, 2015). 
An example of an appliance that helps end-users adjust 
their consumption is the application SmartLiv by the 
Norwegian DSO Ringeriks-Kraft Nett. The application 
enables end-users to observe their consumption 
through hourly metering, track shifts in consumption 
patterns over time and compare their consumption with 
neighbors and other end-users (Ringeriks-Kraft Nett 
AS, 2017). Another vital aspect of implicit end-user 
flexibility deployment is a high time granularity of 
metering.  
Explicit end-user flexibility embodies flexibility 
that can be traded in a market place. With explicit end-
user flexibility, the end-user can be compensated 
through a contract that enables manual or automatic 
shifts in their electricity consumption. One of the key 
drivers for the deployment of explicit end-user 
flexibility is well-defined and liquid flexibility 
markets. Since participation in such markets include 
substantial transaction costs, and since volumes 
produced from a change in consumption from a single 
end-user typically does not satisfy the required bid 
size, a key driver in explicit end-user flexibility 
deployment is the establishment of aggregators who 
aggregate flexibility and offer specific flexibility 
services to the market on behalf of the customer.  
The main goal of flexibility services is to enable the 
end-user to take part in the market place and reduce 
their electricity costs by offering flexibility to the 
system through their consumption patterns. In this 
respect, flexibility services play a vital role in 
balancing supply and demand in the electricity system. 
Ultimately, increased end-user flexibility can result in 
lower electricity prices, which even benefits non-
flexible end-users (U.S. Department of Energy, 2017). 
Both technology and end-user preferences 
influence end-user flexibility deployment. Specific 
flexibility services can only be provided by explicit 
end-user flexibility, while other services are only 
possible with implicit end-user flexibility. Explicit end-
user flexibility is a measurable resource. Hence, it can 
be incorporated in system adequacy assessments in a 
similar way to generation (SEDC, 2016). Implicit end-
user flexibility shifts the commitment to the end user’s 
behavioral patterns. With the roll out of automatic 
meters and increasing customer participation implicit 
end-user flexibility may have a large untapped 
potential.  
Flexibility from large industrial players is actively 
used by the TSO to balance the electrical networks. For 
imbalances in the distribution network, there is a lack 
of measures to adjust production or consumption. 
However, intelligent equipment in the networks may 
make it possible to utilize end-user flexibility from 
smaller electricity consumers, such as households and 
offices. The DSOs may acquire flexibility services 
both implicitly, from designing appropriate tariffs, and 
explicitly, by buying flexibility services.  
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4.2. Handling Peak Demand with End-User 
Flexibility. 
 
In recent years, end-user flexibility is promoted as a 
promising way to deal with new load profiles, an 
increasing share of renewable energy sources and a 
changing energy demand landscape (Papaefthymiou, 
Grave, & Dragoon, 2014). When assessing how to 
handle peak demand through end-user flexibility 
deployment in the distribution network, large volumes 
of end-user flexibility have been hard to obtain for 
research and modelling purposes. Researchers at ETH 
Zürich (Geidl, et al., 2007) solved this by studying the 
interrelation between electrical and thermal energy 
systems in buildings called Energy Hubs. These 
Energy Hubs relied on various energy input variables 
such as electricity, natural gas and heating. 
Furthermore, the Energy Hubs included storage and 
conversion properties, and produced output services 
that complied with certain loads such as electricity, 
heating and cooling. 
Bozchalui et al., (2012) propose a Mixed Integer 
Linear Programming (MILP) optimization problem to 
the Energy Hub concept. The problem minimizes 
energy consumption, cost of energy, emissions and 
peak load. Specific end-user preferences and comfort 
levels are also taken into account. The application of 
the model on a household in Ontario, Canada resulted 
in up to 20% savings on energy costs and a 50% 
reduction in peak demand, all while satisfying the 
designated preferences and comfort levels of the end-
user. 
Strbac et al., (2008) discuss the major benefits and 
challenges of end-user flexibility in the UK power 
system. Key benefits include improved management of 
the demand-supply balance in electricity systems with 
an increasing share of renewable energy, deferring new 
infrastructure investments, simplifying outage 
management and relieving congestion in distribution 
substations. The use of demand response to better 
utilize infrastructure capacity is proposed as a large 
benefit. Strbac highlights the lack of ICT systems to 
support demand response and end-user flexibility 
deployment, immature and insufficient market design 
as well as lacking provision of incentives from 
OFGEM, the UK regulator. 
 
4.3. End-User Flexibility in Investment 
Decisions. 
 
The traditional approach to expanding capacity in 
the network is investing directly in physical 
infrastructure. Hoff, Wenger and Farmer (1996) 
highlights that demand-driven investments in increased 
capacity often results in a period of excess capacity. 
Furthermore, the cost benefit of deferring investments 
results from the specific investment costs and time they 
are deferred (Wang, et al., 2008). In an early study, 
Román, Gómez, Muñoz, & Peco (1999) proposes the 
use of geographic information systems (GIS) to model 
and plan network investments alongside roads and 
transport infrastructure. They conclude that this 
approach reduced barriers and infeasibilities in 
network planning.  
El Khattam, Hegazy & Salama (2005) proposes a 
new model for network investments where the 
positioning and sizing of distributed generation (DG) 
sources are optimized. Several investment alternatives 
are tested, including expanding an existing substation 
and adding new feeders to purchasing power from an 
existing intertie to meet load demand growth. They 
conclude that optimizing this positioning and sizing 
can result in a 20% reduction in investment costs.  
Méndez et al., (2006) also studies the impact of DG 
on deferring distribution network investments. A main 
result from their research is that with 0% penetration of 
DG, load increases in the distribution network can 
grow by 171.4 % until reaching an overload probability 
of 0.5%, while a 30% penetration of DG allows a load 
increase of 196.4% until reaching an overload 
probability of 0.5%. They also highlight that DG plants 
with solar PV generation allow higher load growths 
before making network reinvestments than DG plants 
with wind power generation. This is due to a higher 
randomness in wind energy production.  
Piccolo & Siano (2009) discusses how DG can 
serve as an alternative distribution planning option by 
providing opportunities to capture the deferment 
benefit. They highlight the regulatory side of the issue 
and conclude that European legislations must be 
revised to make DG a feasible option to investments in 
infrastructure. By obliging network operators to require 
for local power generation as a direct alternative to 
network infrastructure reinvestments, the deferral 
benefits of DG can be reaped.  
Pudjianto et al., (2013) introduces smart control to 
minimize distribution network reinforcements. They 
simulate how network infrastructure investments 
differs in a business-as-usual scenario and a Smart 
Grid scenario. Without smart infrastructure 
management, they estimate that between 2010 and 
2050, the total distribution network reinforcements in 
the UK will amount to £36 billion.  By applying smart 
charging of vehicles, smart heat pumps and optimized 
control of network voltage regulators, they conclude 
that there is a substantial savings potential in 
infrastructure investment costs. The report does not 
explicitly estimate any savings. 
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Spiliotis, Ramos and Belmans (2016) analyze how 
end-user flexibility can be used to solve capacity 
problems and defer physical network expansions in the 
distribution network. They develop and define the 
FlexMart model, which enables the DSO to purchase 
end-user flexibility offered by residential end-users. 
The model works as a long-term planning tool and 
provide an optimal combination of physical 
expansions, flexibility deployment and dispatch to 
reassure capacity needs in network operations are met. 
 
4.4. Quantifying the Technical Potential of 
End-User Flexibility. 
 
The technical potential can be described as the 
amount of flexibility end-users can offer to the 
electricity system. Several research projects have 
studied and quantified the flexibility potential in 
Norway and the Nordic region. 
An early study conducted by Meland et al., in 2006, 
estimated the technical potential of end-user flexibility 
by considering electricity volumes that could be 
replaced by other energy carriers. This study focused 
on office buildings, residential homes and industrial 
complexes. The flexible load is estimated partly by 
assuming plausible changes in energy carriers and by 
assuming an average time of 2000 hours each year. 
The study concluded that by switching energy carriers, 
2700 to 4000 MW of flexibility were made available. 
In a SINTEF-study from 2010, Sæle & Grande 
estimates the technical potential in Norwegian 
households by analyzing results from a pilot by the 
DSO Malvik Everk. The results from the pilot was an 
estimated reduction in power output of 1 to 2,5 kWh/h 
per end-user, depending on whether they were 
equipped with hot water boilers or water based 
residential heating systems respectively. By scaling 
these results based on a 50% acceptance rate of 
automated control of warm water tanks nationally, the 
study concluded that the technical potential in these 
Norwegian households amounted to 1000 MW. 
Xrgia & EC Group (2012) estimated the technical 
potential of end-user flexibility in the Norwegian 
counties of Oslo and Akershus. Based on electricity 
consumption statistics, estimates of future power 
outtakes and qualitative assessments of end-user 
flexibility deployment, an estimated technical potential 
of 550 MW in Oslo and Akershus was found. 
The technical potential of end-user flexibility will 
also be influenced by a growing fleet of EV´s.  In the 
report “Does the electrical network have enough 
capacity to include electrical buses, ferries and cars?” 
from 2017, NVE estimates that each additional EV 
represent an increase of 0.7 kW in peak demand. The 
current fleet of roughly 125 000 EVs accounts for 100 
MW in potential flexibility. This does not account for 
the technical potential in charging appliances in the 
Norwegian distribution network (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 
2017). 
Even though the electricity systems in Norway and 
Sweden are slightly different, both countries possess 
long-term storage and flexibility solutions in 
hydropower generation, and have integrated electricity 
markets through Nord Pool. Comparing technical 
potential between the two countries is thus a feasible 
approach. In 2016, The Swedish Energy Market 
Inspectorate (EI) conducted an extensive study of the 
technical potential of end-user flexibility in Sweden. 
The technical potential in Sweden was estimated to 
almost 8000 MW in the winter months with 5500 MW 
of this potential being supplied by residential end-
users. In the summer months, the estimated flexibility 
was 3700 MW, with 1700 MW being supplied by 
residential end-users. 
An earlier Swedish project, Elforsk, studied the 
possibility of curtailing electric heating and water 
heater loads. An average controllable load of 4-5 kW 
per house at 10-15 degrees below zero implied a 
technical potential of approximately 1500 MW in 
Sweden (Elforsk, 2006). 
Gaia Consulting (2011) estimated the practical 
potential for end-user flexibility in the Nordic region. 
The research highlighted that most of the flexibility 
potential is in Swedish and Norwegian households, 
with some flexibility available in Finnish households 
and a very limited flexibility potential in Danish 
households. The results relied heavily on economical, 
technical and practical assumptions, but estimated the 
end-user flexibility potential in the Nordic region to 
between 4000 MW and 7000 MW, excluding 
flexibility from the industry. From this potential 
flexibility, between 1000 MW and 3500 MW 
originated from Norwegian end-users. 
In summary, several attempts of quantifying the 
technical potential of end-user flexibility has been 
conducted, both in Norway and abroad. However, it is 
not clear from these research projects if this potential 
stems from explicit- or implicit end-user flexibility. In 
a report from 2016, COWI Belgium highlighted that 
roughly 92% of potential peak reductions induced by 
end-user flexibility deployment would come from 
explicit end-user flexibility. The remaining 8% would 
come from price based programs and implicit end-user 
flexibility.  
 
4.5. Dynamic Pricing, Tariffs and End-User 
Flexibility. 
 
Faruqui & Sergici (2010) review 15 different 
Demand Response pilots in the U.S, Canada, Australia 
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and France. All pilots target peak demand reductions 
through dynamic electricity pricing. The review 
conclude that ToU-rates induce a peak demand 
reduction of 3 to 6%, while CPP-tariffing induce a 
peak demand reduction of 13 to 20%. Faruqui and 
Sergici highlight that by accounting for enabling 
technologies, the CPP-tariffing leads to a peak demand 
reduction of 27 to 44% due to different compensation 
mechanisms. 
Bartusch et al. (2011) analyze how end-users 
respond to a demand based ToU-tariff. By utilizing this 
indirect control contract, a Swedish DSO wanted to 
investigate how they could reduce peak load in their 
distribution network. The study concludes that end-
users respond positively to being charged according to 
this type of tariff. Furthermore, the introduction of the 
tariff decreased the peak demand substantially.  
In a later study, Bartusch et al. (2014) study the 
effect of a power tariff on electricity consumption in a 
residential area of Stockholm. The attitude to shift 
consumption were measured over a long period, where 
the researchers tested the attitude over six years. The 
research concluded that although the attitude to shift 
consumption from times of high demand of electricity 
to times of low demand of electricity were significant, 
it was not reflected through an actual shift in 
consumption over time.  
Haring & Andersson (2014) highlight the need for 
incentive based rewarding contracts when pursuing 
direct control flexibility mechanisms. Efficient 
contracts between the prosumer and central agent must 
be individually rational and incentive compatible. To 
make contracts individually rational, the end-user must 
be rewarded and not make a loss from entering the 
flexibility contract. Incentive compatibility occurs 
when the end-user receives incentives to display and 
share their actual flexibility costs. By introducing a 
non-linear framework of pricing, capacity reservation 
and deployment of reserve energy are being rewarded 
separately. 
Another viable business model is proposed by 
Campaigne and Oren (2016). By utilizing a fuse 
control paradigm, flexibility aggregators impose 
capacity constraints on prosumers or penalize them for 
breaching a capacity threshold. Subsequently, the 
prosumers allocate the available electricity to separate 
devices. The contract between the flexibility 
aggregator and the prosumer is seasonal, and typically 
allow the aggregator to curtail consumption over time 
given a certain probability of curtailment. 
 
4.6. Trading End-User Flexibility in Flexibility 
Markets. 
 
Eid et al. (2016) discuss a flexibility market design 
inspired by the French trading system and markets for 
flexibility in both the short-, medium- and long-term 
trading periods. In the French trading system, 
minimum bid capacities for balancing services have 
been reduced from 50 MW to 10 MW to motivate 
smaller parties like independent aggregators to 
participate in the balancing markets. The research is 
based on five markets; ancillary services, system 
balancing and network congestion management, spot 
markets and generation capacity markets.  
Zhang et al. (2014) introduces a clearinghouse 
concept for flexibility called FLECH at the distribution 
level. The FLECH market utilizes aggregator-based 
offers to promote small scale DERs with up to 5MW 
for their active market participation. In this market 
design, the compensation is stipulated by the capacity 
needs of the DSO. The aggregator then responds to this 
capacity need by bidding prices and quantities of 
flexibility, and the FLECH market runs single-side 
auctions or super market trading where the aggregator 
designs specific flexibility products that are presented 
to the end-users.  
A third, bid-less flexibility market design is 
presented by Gantenbein et al. (2012). By updating and 
publishing prices in five-minute intervals, customers 
can respond to this price continuously by shifting their 
load (Larsen, et al., 2015).  
ENFO (2016) discuss a “traffic light regulation” of 
monopoly and market functions in the electricity 
system, which was first proposed by Eurelectric (2014) 
in their report “Active Distribution System 
Management”. This system is based on the need for 
specific option schemes for Norwegian DSO´s. 
Separating monopoly- and market activities makes it 
possible to introduce new products that enables the 
end-user to participate in the market. 
 
5. Case study  
 
The case study is provided by Skagerak Nett, a 
DSO in southern Norway, and it illustrates how end-
user flexibility can be used to defer investments, in this 
particular case, in upgrading the capacity of two 
transformers in a substation. The increased capacity is 
necessary both to handle peak load and to provide 
reserve in case of component malfunction. 
The DSO considers two different Scenarios 
concerning the use of flexibility. In scenario 1, end-
user flexibility is used only in case of malfunction in 
the transformers. In the second scenario, end-user 
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flexibility is used in case of malfunctions as well as to 
handle peak loads in normal operations. The scenarios 
represent two possible applications that the industry 
considers valuable and feasible, and both may help to 
defer capacity-increasing investments. 
Another dimension studied by the DSO is the 
sources of flexibility, i.e. who will provide the 
flexibility services to the DSO. In the following, F1 
includes industrial consumers that are already flexible 
to the TSO, while F2 also includes a tentative 
flexibility from households, assuming that 1/3 of the 
households in the area will provide 1 and 1.5 kW in 
off-peak and peak hours respectively.  
Three different load increase predictions are 
considered: a 34 % increase in load until 2040, as well 
as a 16 % increase and 0 % increase. 
Load increases and component malfunctions have 
traditionally been resolved by direct investments in 
capacity increasing assets and reserves, and end-user 
flexibility is presented as an alternative technology. 
We discuss four alternatives or cases, one traditional 
investment case, which serves as the base case, and 
three cases with different compensation schemes for 
end-user flexibility: 
1. Investing in capacity increase without any use of 
end-user flexibility. 
2. Compensating flexible end-users through 
discounted network tariffs. 
3. Compensating flexible end-users through an 
availability payment of 20,000 NOK per MWh 
and an activation payment of 20,000 NOK per 
MWh. 
4. Compensating flexible end-users through an 
activation payment of 30,000 NOK per MWh. 
In order to evaluate the effect on cost, the DSO has 
used historical data on load, probability of failures, and 
different cost elements. The compensation levels in the 
flexibility mechanisms are high, but lower than the 
value of lost load. If too high, the cost of the flexibility 
mechanisms will be overestimated. 
The alternatives given by the four cases above, 
have different effects on different cost groups (ref. 
section 2.3). In the first case, the investment expense 
will increase CAPEX immediately, while this increase 
is delayed for the other cases. The DSO invests in the 
capacity upgrade in all four cases, however at different 
points in time, given by when the N-1 criterion is no 
longer met. The OPEX will be higher in cases 2-4, due 
to switching and repair cost, but also due to the 
flexibility payment. These costs are however lower in 
case 2, since the tariff discounts to flexible consumers 
will be compensated by higher tariffs to non-flexible 
consumers (the incentive regulation fixes the total 
revenue for each company, and the company collects 
the revenue by two-part tariffs). VOLL and network 
losses are similar, but these costs, especially losses, are 
particularly high if the load increase is high. Table 1 
summarizes the present value of cost changes over the 
investment cycle (i.e. until 2040) in different 
situations. 
 
Table 1. PV of cost. 
Case Flexible volume 34 % 16 % 0 % 34 % 16 % 0 %
1 - 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
F1 93 % 42 % 16 % 87 % 16 % 5 %
F2 90 % 41 % 16 % 81 % 13 % 7 %
F1 97 % 63 % 37 % 94 % 61 % 59 %
F2 98 % 70 % 45 % 105 % 101 % 70 %
F1 93 % 42 % 16 % 91 % 52 % 55 %
F2 90 % 41 % 17 % 106 % 103 % 59 %
3
4
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Load Increase Prediction Load Increase Prediction
2
  
Table 1 shows normalized cost figures (the lower 
number, the better), with the investment case as the 
base case (100 %). In the flexible load cases, 
investments are deferred by 3-4 years with the high 
load increase, and by 22 years otherwise. We also note 
that flexibility is better with lower load increases and if 
more suppliers can provide flexibility. Moreover, the 
costs are lower if flexibility is provided by tariff 
reductions, particularly in the situations where 
flexibility is much used, i.e. with 16 % or 0 % load 
increase. This is due to the incentive regulation model, 
where it is advantageous for the company to avoid 
cost, since increasing the cost may reduce efficiency 
scores and costs are not fully compensated in the 
yardstick model (ref. section 2.3). This illustrates that 
the vertical separation, that was the starting point of the 
Norwegian deregulation, is not so straightforward, and 
that local flexibility markets can influence and interact 
with the regulation model in unexpected ways. In this 
case, the compensation mechanism is not neutral under 
the regulation model, and this may favor some ways of 
solving a problem at the expense of others. 
To understand the full effect on the companies' 
incomes, we should also calculate the revenue caps. 
However, these are even more difficult to forecast, 
since in order to do so, we need to estimate the effects 
not only on cost, but also on the benchmarking results. 
This involves estimating the outputs too, and in general 
what happens to other companies in the industry over 
several decades. An example for the high load increase 
is given in table 2, where changes in revenue are 
normalized relative to case 1. 
From Table 2 we notice that cases 2 and 4 are 
similar in Scenario 1. This is because flexibility is little 
used when the load increase is high. Then the 
flexibility mechanism with high activation payment is 
better than the one with both activation and availability 
payment (case 3). The choice of compensation method 
may affect revenues positively or negatively, since the 
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larger cost of direct payments for flexibility services on 
the one hand increases cost and on the other hand 
decreases efficiency, and thus possibly the cost norm.  
 
Table 2. PV of revenue caps. 
  
The most profitable situation occurs when end-user 
flexibility allows investments to be deferred, and this 
flexibility can be invoked by tariff redistributions.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
End-user flexibility, together with distributed 
generation and storage, may provide alternatives to 
investing and reinvesting in grid capacity in the local 
networks. From the presented case study, we notice 
that the choice of compensation method to customers 
have a large impact on the profitability of the network 
companies. By issuing direct payments for flexibility 
services, end-user flexibility may result in a higher 
revenue cap although efficiency is lower, while 
redistribution of network tariffs have only a marginal 
effect on changes in efficiency and revenue cap. Thus, 
using end-user flexibility to defer network investments 
is likely to come with a redistribution of regulated 
network tariffs rather than development of local 
flexibility markets. This highlights some of the future 
challenges that the regulator faces in setting a 
regulatory framework for end-user flexibility, and it 
challenges the vertical separation that has been a 
corner stone in the deregulated electricity market.  
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